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FOOD SAFETY META-CONTROLS IN THE NETHERLANDS* 
 
 
Paul Verbruggen & Tetty Havinga** 
 
Abstract 
Both public and private actors are involved in the monitoring and enforcement of compliance 
with public food safety norms. Public authorities in countries such as the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and Canada have recently started to develop forms of coordination and 
collaboration with private food safety control systems. Such policies bring with them the risk of 
regulatory capture, loss of transparency and fuzzy accountability relationships. Here we ana-
lyse how the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (de Nederlandse 
Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit – NVWA) assesses and monitors the functioning of private food 
safety control systems (meta-control) so it can use these private systems in its own enforcement 
activities. We do so by discussing two national private systems that have been formally ac-
cepted by the NVWA: Bureau de Wit and RiskPlaza. The paper examines the safeguards 
that the public enforcement agency deploys while coordinating its own activities with private 
food safety controls, the advantages and risks involved in this strategy, and the extent to 
which this policy can be improved. The study is based on the analysis of policy documents, 
public and private regulation and open-ended interviews with representatives of the public 
and private sector in the Netherlands. 
 
Key words 
Meta-control; food governance; self-regulation; private food controls; food inspectorate; 
food safety; Netherlands  
1. Introduction 
Food safety regulation is a responsibility that is shared between public and 
private actors. Government and industry have developed sophisticated moni-
toring and enforcement systems to control and manage food safety risks. An 
important development is the emergence of arrangements and regimes in which 
public and private actors organize their respective regulatory activities to at-
tain the common goal of ensuring safe food. The coordination and management 
of regulatory capacity appears attractive in times of global food chains, the 
internationalisation of public food safety controls, and national budget deficits 
(Havinga and Van Waarden 2013). However, it is not clear how much such 
‘hybridisation’ of food safety controls contributes to higher levels of food 
safety. Moreover, certain risks seem manifest, including regulatory capture, loss 
                                         
*  This paper is based on previous empirical research published in Dutch (Verbruggen and 
Havinga 2014a). 
**  Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
Verbruggen & Havinga: Food Safety Meta-Controls in the Netherlands 
 
 
4 
 
of transparency and fuzzy accountability relationships (Garcia Martinez, Ver-
bruggen and Fearne 2013). 
The question is how these risks can be controlled and managed. A public 
enforcer is not likely to rely on private food safety controls without ensuring 
that public legal norms are complied with and the level of compliance is the 
same as in case of public enforcement, if not better. In the Netherlands, the 
Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (Nederlandse Voed-
sel en Warenautoriteit – NVWA) has recently developed a policy of assessing 
private systems of food safety controls so as to use these private systems in its 
own enforcement activities. This paper enquires how the NVWA has designed 
this policy of ‘meta-control’ (controlling the controllers) and asks which safe-
guards the public enforcement agency deploys while coordinating its own ac-
tivities with private food safety controls, and the extent to which this policy can 
be improved. 
These are pressing questions, given the fact that the NVWA is currently be-
ing challenged to more efficiently allocate enforcement resources, after succes-
sive rounds of budget cuts have seriously limited those resources. Elsewhere, 
too, public enforcement agencies in the food sector are developing collabor-
ative regulatory arrangements with private actors to deploy their resources in 
more efficient and innovative ways. Since the mid-2000s, the Food Standards 
Agency in the United Kingdom has promoted better coordination between the 
monitoring and enforcement activities of the local food authorities and the ac-
tivities undertaken by the private sector, mainly focusing on so-called ‘farm 
assurance schemes’ (Kirk-Wilson 2002). The Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
(2012) recently announced that it was to develop guidelines for the recognition 
of ‘third-party service delivery providers’. The U.S. Food & Drug Administration 
(2013) has also indicated that, in the context of the Food Safety Modernization 
Act, it wants to deploy private certification from recognised ‘third-party audi-
tors’ to verify the food safety compliance of imported goods. 
The questions framed above are central to the explorative research set out 
in this paper, in which we conducted a comparative analysis of two private 
food safety control systems – known as Bureau de Wit and RiskPlaza – which 
the NVWA has accepted as ‘systems of self-control’ for food produce. The 
methodological choices that underlie this analysis are explained in Section 4. In 
what follows, we first define what we mean by ‘meta-control’ (2) and discuss 
the factors that have driven the emergence of such a policy in the Netherlands 
(3). The analysis of Bureau de Wit (5) and RiskPlaza (6) focuses on the design 
of these systems of private control and how the NVWA coordinates its own en-
forcement activities with them. The results of this analysis are compared and 
discussed to highlight the approach the NVWA has taken to the respective pri-
vate systems, and discuss the risks involved in those approaches (8).  
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2. Hybridisation and meta-control of food governance 
Meta-control – and the broader term meta-regulation – should be considered 
a ‘hybrid’ regulatory approach. Hybridity involves the combination of (at least) 
two different entities in a regulatory regime, thus constituting a composite, 
mixed form of regulation (Havinga and Verbruggen 2014). Since meta-control 
involves two (or more) different actors, implies the management of monitoring 
and enforcement activities of one actor by the other(s), and may occur between 
different categories of actors (public-public, private-private, public-private, 
and private-public), it is a clear manifestation of hybridity (cf. Oude Vrielink et 
al. 2011).  
What do we mean by ‘meta-control’? In essence, meta-control concerns the 
assessment and control of (other) control systems. In an arrangement of meta-
controls, the actor that performs monitoring and enforcement activities (the first 
tier) is itself subject to systems of control. The actor that performs this meta-
control function (the second or third tier) does not itself monitor or enforce regu-
lation vis-à-vis the regulated. Instead, its role is limited to managing, verifying 
and designing the first-tier control mechanisms and, more broadly, the frame-
work for meta-control. Meta-control thus implies a two- (or three-) stage pro-
cess of monitoring and enforcement, in which the role of the meta-controller 
changes from what Osborne and Gaebler (1992) have famously called rowing 
to steering. 
Meta-control is distinct from strategies that have been described as ‘en-
forced self-regulation’ and ‘management-based regulation’. These forms of 
regulation are characterised by the public approval of private, internal man-
agement systems at the firm-level, which enable individual firms to self-assess 
and ensure regulatory compliance (Fairman and Yapp 2005, Coglianese and 
Lazer 2003). Meta-control, by contrast, concerns the approval of monitoring 
and enforcement activities carried out by private, external actors (such as 
third-party auditors and certification bodies) who use their own food safety 
management systems to assess and ensure regulatory compliance by the firm. 
Nonetheless, meta-control can involve enforced self-regulation or management-
based regulation. This is the case if the first tier controller (e.g. a third-party 
auditor or licensed certification body) verifies whether a firm’s internal risk 
management system complies with a set of regulatory norms by using a verifi-
cation scheme, while subject to control and inspection by another body (e.g. a 
standard-setting body, accreditation institution or public enforcement agency). 
In our view, meta-control then concerns the relationship between the first and 
second tier of control, and not – in contrast to enforced self-regulation or man-
agement-based regulation – risk management systems at firm-level. 
Accordingly, meta-control involves those activities that seek to regulate and 
steer the mechanisms, procedures and instruments for monitoring and enforcing 
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regulatory compliance, but are managed by others. In that sense, meta-control 
closely aligns with the concept of ‘meta-regulation’. While Coglianese and 
Mendelson (2010, p. 147) have correctly observed that there is no agreement 
on the definition of meta-regulation, Parker (2002, p. 15) aptly captures the 
common core of studies of meta-regulation by holding that the concept princi-
pally concerns the activity of ‘(...) regulating the regulators, whether they be 
public agencies, private corporate self-regulators or third party gatekeepers’. 
Instead of independently setting regulatory standards and monitoring and en-
forcing them, the meta-regulator – just like the meta-controller – operates at a 
distance by using other actors’ mechanisms. However, if these mechanisms are 
no longer deemed adequate, the meta-regulator intervenes and sets new 
standards with which the first-tier regulator must comply. 
Both public and private actors may act as meta-regulators by exerting in-
fluence on or setting conditions for regulatory activities, whether such activities 
be standard-setting, monitoring or enforcement (Scott 2012, Verbruggen and 
Havinga 2014b). In this sense, meta-control is a form of meta-regulation that 
focuses on the activities of monitoring and enforcement in a regulatory regime. 
Although here we focus merely on meta-controls exercised by the public en-
forcement agency NVWA on two national private food safety control systems, 
the concepts of meta-regulation and meta-control – in our view – not only in-
volve the regulation of private systems by public actors, but also, conversely 
the regulation of public regimes by private actors (Scott 2002), as well as the 
regulation of public and private actors among themselves (Verbruggen and 
Havinga 2014b). 
3. Drivers for meta-control 
Which factors have driven the development of NVWA oversight on private 
food safety control systems in the Netherlands? One relevant factor is that the 
capacity of public agencies to regulate food safety is increasingly coming 
under pressure. There are several aspects to this situation, of which two of the 
most relevant are briefly discussed here, namely the globalisation of food sup-
ply chains, and the recurrent institutional reforms and budget cuts. Today, sup-
ply chains in the food sector are often international in scope, which means that 
the various stages of food production may not occur within the jurisdiction of a 
single public enforcement agency, which is territorially defined. This makes it 
difficult for such agencies to warrant the safety and quality of the entire pro-
duction process. In the Netherlands this is potentially a serious problem, as the 
country plays a major role in the global trade of food products. The Nether-
lands is the largest vegetable exporting country in the world (12% of the total 
global trade), but the country also takes a considerable share of the trade in 
other product categories (UN Comtrade 2011). To retain that position, it is in 
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the interest of the Netherlands to ensure the safety of the food it trades. How-
ever, the quantities of food traded make it nearly impossible for the public 
enforcer – the NVWA – to fulfil that task. We therefore observe that the 
NVWA is aligning its activities with other bodies, both public and private, at 
national and international levels. 
It is against that background that we should view the development of the 
NVWA, which has been confronted with a number of institutional reforms and 
budget restrictions that have seriously limited its capacity to perform periodic 
inspections to assess compliance levels (Havinga and Van Waarden 2013, 
p. 81ff).1 Efficiency has been the buzzword for the last decade, although it is 
not clear whether, or how much the suggested strategies have led to the antici-
pated efficiencies. Within this context, the NVWA has focused on ‘system con-
trols’ (systeemtoezicht), which implies a shift from monitoring substantive food 
safety norms to oversight of production processes and HACCP-based systems2 
adopted by individual companies (Helderman and Honingh 2009, De Bree 
2010). Coordination with private food safety systems also fits the rationale of 
this approach, since these systems may – it is contended – compensate for the 
gaps that the NVWA has been forced to leave unfulfilled. Put differently, pub-
lic oversight can be reduced in favour of these private systems, provided they 
are adequate. This, in turn, reduces the regulatory burdens imposed by public 
agencies. 
A second factor that has played a decisive role in the development of the 
NVWA policy of meta-control is the changes that have occurred in the legal 
framework applying to food safety controls. In response to the BSE crisis in 
1996, this framework was significantly reformed both at the national and 
European level (Vos 2000). Whereas food safety was previously seen as the 
responsibility primarily of the public sector, now both the public and private 
sector share that responsibility. Regulation 178/2002/EC, which currently pro-
vides the general public legal framework for food safety controls in the Euro-
pean Union (EU), requires food and feed producers to meet the applicable 
regulatory standards in all stages of the production, processing and distribution 
of food and feed. The EU Member States must maintain an effective legal sys-
                                         
1  After several food safety (the salmonella Thomson and EHEC outbreaks) and non-food 
safety related incidents (horsemeat), an increase in the number of food safety inspectors 
was announced in December 2013. See: Brief van de staatssecretaris van Economische 
Zaken en de minister van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport aan de Tweede Kamer 
d.d. 19 december 2013, Plan van aanpak NVWA). 
2  HACCP stands for Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point. Food businesses are le-
gally obliged to develop and maintain a food safety management system based on the 
principles of HACCP. 
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tem to see that food safety is ensured.3 By making the private sector also re-
sponsible for food safety, it became possible for public authorities such as the 
NVWA to review and reallocate tasks and resources. 
Other pieces of European legislation that concern the exercise of inspec-
tions and controls further promote this reorientation. Regulation 882/2004/EC 
requires that the NVWA and other public authorities in the EU shall conduct 
food safety inspections, without prior notice, on a risk basis and with appropri-
ate frequency, taking into account the identified risks, past compliance records, 
the reliability of the authority’s own checks and any other information that 
might signal non-compliance.4 The regulation’s preamble specifies the latter 
point, noting that the frequency of the controls should be proportionate to the 
risk, ‘taking into account the results of the checks carried out by feed and food 
business operators under HACCP based control programmes or quality assur-
ance programmes, where such programmes are designed to meet requirements 
of feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules’.5 This enables 
the NVWA to ascribe a role to private food safety control systems in their insti-
tutional framework to ensure food safety. The result is that food safety controls 
in the Netherlands are hybridised to a considerable degree. 
A third important factor is the motivation of the private sector to collabor-
ate with the NVWA. Owners of private food safety control systems have a 
manifest, commercial interest in having their system accepted by the public ag-
ency. After all, such public approval will serve as a sign of expertise and dili-
gence in the private system, which is likely to attract more (paying) customers. 
This is a significant incentive for owners to collaborate with the NVWA and 
subject themselves to its (meta-) control.6 This ‘buy in’ offers the NVWA a 
possibility to collaborate with the private sector since meta-control presupposes 
a certain level of cooperation and is, in that sense, no one-way street. How-
ever, the presence of the commercial motivation for collaboration implies the 
risk that the private interests (attracting new customers, making a profit) will 
                                         
3  Article 17(1) and (2) of Regulation 178/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of 
food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures 
in matters of food safety [2000] OJ L 31/1. 
4  Article 3(1) Regulation 882/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance 
with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules [2004] OJ L 191/1. 
5  Recital 13 Regulation 882/2004/EC. 
6  Not only the owners, but also food business operators have noted that they would like to 
see the NVWA take (greater) consideration of private systems and certifications in de-
termining its enforcement action. Almost half the firms certified by ISACert (a major certi-
fication body in the Netherlands) suggested in a survey conducted by ISACert among its 
customers that the NVWA does not take sufficient consideration of their audit results to 
base its inspections on (ISACert 2013).  
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undermine the public ones (astute enforcement, food safety). To maintain the 
proper balance between these interests, the NVWA is challenged to set down 
adequate safeguards and conditions under which the collaboration can take 
place.  
4. Methodology 
To explore the way the NVWA assesses and monitors private food safety con-
trol systems and deploys its meta-control strategy, we have investigated two 
such systems, namely Bureau de Wit (BDW) and RiskPlaza. These are two of 
the in total eleven so-called ‘self-control systems’ which the NVWA accepted in 
the food production, catering, and retail industries. The agency committed itself 
to taking these systems (and their audit results) into account when determining 
its inspection frequency, the depth and length of its inspections, and the inter-
ventions at participating firms. The private systems that have been accepted so 
far are voluntary and principally national in scope. Certification for transna-
tional standards, such as those recognized within the Global Food Safety Initia-
tive (GFSI), have not (yet) been accepted by the NVWA, although the agency 
was investigating that option at the time of writing. 
The cases were not selected according to any theoretically driven princi-
ples. Very little was known about the operation of most accepted self-control 
systems when we initiated our research. The cases we selected were sought to 
ensure a high level of variation.  
The system operated by BDW is one of seven accepted systems that moni-
tor compliance with applicable guides to good hygienic practices by artisan, 
non-industrial food business operators. These guides are developed on a sec-
toral basis by the respective representative industry bodies and submitted to 
the NVWA for formal approval, after which they form the basis for NVWA 
inspections in the sector concerned. BDW was accepted by the NVWA in 
December 2011. BDW’s customers include firms in the catering, hotel, restau-
rant, café, retail, and health care sector.  
RiskPlaza is one of the four other systems accepted by the NVWA. The 
choice to include RiskPlaza in our analysis is, in part, related to the fact that 
many consider this system an example of how the NVWA should collaborate 
with private sector initiatives (Havinga and Van Waarden 2013, p. 61). Risk-
Plaza was created at the joint initiative of the bakery sector and the Dutch 
trade association called the ‘Agricultural Product Board’ (Productschap Akker-
bouw). This association is a semi-public institution under Dutch administrative 
law and functions as a forum for employers and employees in the agri-food 
business. The RiskPlaza scheme aims to control food safety hazards in raw ma-
terials and ingredients for food production. It consists of two modules: a data-
base that identifies potential safety hazards and an HACCP-based ‘RiskPlaza 
Verbruggen & Havinga: Food Safety Meta-Controls in the Netherlands 
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Audit+’ system in which accredited certification bodies perform the audits. 
RiskPlaza was accepted by the NVWA in September 2012. 
The selected private food safety control systems differ as regards a num-
ber of elements that, we anticipate, are likely to influence how the NVWA de-
signs and implements its meta-control approach. First, BDW is a medium-sized, 
for-profit company with some 50 years of experience in verification and certi-
fication services. By contrast, RiskPlaza was launched in 2008 as a multi-
stakeholder initiative and is administered by the not-for-profit Product Board. 
This difference appears relevant to the risk of (regulatory) capture, against 
which NVWA should take preventative measures. Second, firms participating in 
the BDW system are no longer subject to official inspections by the NVWA. 
RiskPlaza Audit+ firms will still be subject to NVWA inspections, but they will 
only look at the parts not covered by the RiskPlaza audit. This difference might 
lead the NVWA to set different requirements for the acceptance of the sys-
tems. Third, BDW only verifies compliance with pre-existing industry guides to 
good hygienic practice. In the case of RiskPlaza, the database that is part of 
the system concretises the norms upon which the audit is based, which are ad-
opted in collaboration with the NVWA, experts and certification bodies per-
forming the audits. The arrangement with RiskPlaza thus not only concerns the 
verification of compliance with regulatory norms, but also the concretisation of 
those norms. It appears to us that this aspect will also impact on the NVWA’s 
meta-control strategy. 
In describing the cases we identify the organisations that are concerned 
with the system, what their respective responsibilities and obligations are, the 
legal format into which those obligations have been cast, and the methodology 
for compliance verification (nature, purpose and frequency of visits). Subse-
quently, we describe the meta-control approach of the NVWA: what require-
ments does the NVWA set for acceptance of the private system and how does 
the NVWA monitor the system’s functioning after acceptance? Our focus here is 
on the ways in which the public agency seeks to manage and control the risks 
that are concerned with this collaboration. The case descriptions are based on 
publicly available documents (e.g. NVWA policy documents, legislation, private 
regulation and audit protocols) and four open-ended interviews with represen-
tatives of BDW, RiskPlaza, and the NVWA.7 
                                         
7   We conducted four interviews, namely with the ‘system expert’ of RiskPlaza, the technical 
director of BDW (who is responsible for the development of the verification system), an 
auditor working for one of the RiskPlaza recognized certification bodies that perform 
RiskPlaza Audit+ visits, and a NVWA staff member responsible for developing of the 
policy of accepted self-control systems in the catering, retail and health care sector. In 
addition, we used data obtained from two interviews conducted by one of the authors 
with a staff member of the Product Board involved in the development of RiskPlaza and 
→ 
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5. Bureau de Wit 
System 
BDW is a for-profit company offering verification and consultation services 
concerning food safety, water safety, air safety and rodent extermination. The 
company was established some 50 years ago as a laboratory, which today is 
accredited according to ISO standards. BDW has its own labelling scheme 
(keurmerk). Its services include inspections, training, sample taking and analysis, 
consultancy, and the development of internal quality assurance systems. Cus-
tomers operate in the catering, hotel, restaurant, café, retail and health care 
sector. Many of the BDW customers are part of branded chains or franchises, 
in which case, the head office requires its subsidiaries or franchise takers to 
apply for the BDW label to ensure a certain level of quality and to prevent 
potential brand damage by safety incidents.  
The BDW food safety control system involves a minimum of two annual in-
spections, during which compliance with the applicable guide to good hygienic 
practice and public regulation is verified. The inspection results are carefully 
documented and (if needed) an action plan is drafted to improve compliance. 
BDW provides support and follow-up concerning the implementation of such a 
plan. Firms that have been rated 80% compliance in a minimum of two conse-
cutive inspections are awarded the BDW label (including the notification of that 
award on the BDW website) and will benefit from a lower inspection fre-
quency by the NVWA. A contract between BDW and its customers provides the 
legal basis for BDW inspections. The contract also entitles BDW to pass on to 
the NVWA the audit results of customers in the context of a system audit con-
ducted by the public agency on the BDW system. BDW only informs the NVWA 
about firms that meet the 80% threshold and qualify, to benefit from a laxer 
official inspection regime. These firms are no longer visited by the NVWA; the 
agency considers the BDW audit sufficient.8  
The normative framework applying to the BDW inspections is the same as 
the one applied to official NVWA inspections, namely public legal norms as 
operationalised by the applicable guide to good hygienic practice. There are, 
however, some important differences between the inspections carried out by 
BDW and the agency. BDW inspectors must check all requirements set out by 
the guide to good hygienic practice during an inspection, whereas NVWA in-
spectors are permitted to focus on particular aspects (e.g. cleaning, sell-by 
                                         
a staff member of the NVWA responsible for the development of the policy of accepted 
self-control systems for food and feed production. 
8  BDW, Inspectieprotocol Zelfcontrolesysteem BDW, 1 March 2012, Version 7 (available 
at website BDW). 
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dates, cooling facilities, etc) as part of the prioritised goals in the agency’s en-
forcement policy. Moreover, the level of required regulatory compliance is 
higher in case of the BDW: while the NVWA will not take enforcement meas-
ures if 60% of the requirements in the guide to good hygienic practice are met, 
BDW should maintain a compliance standard of 80%. The BDW inspection fre-
quency is also higher than that of the NVWA. BDW claims that it visits its cus-
tomers four times a year, of which at least two visits are unannounced. The 
NVWA requires a minimum of one unannounced annual visit for accepted self-
control systems that monitor compliance with guides to good hygienic practices. 
Meta-control 
What instruments and procedures does the NVWA use to assess and monitor 
BDW performance? Before accepting the BDW system (and other self-control 
systems that monitor compliance with guides to good hygienic practices), the 
NVWA carries out an extensive initial assessment. This ex ante check starts off 
with talks and discussions with BDW to map and test the methodology of the 
private system. Aspects that feature prominently in these meetings are the 
norms that are assessed upon inspection, the research methodology used (e.g. 
auditing, sample taking, witness audits), the way questions are asked, the train-
ing of inspectors, and the ways in which the system is reviewed and updated. 
If the NVWA is convinced of the robustness of the private system, a so-
called ‘address test’ is organised: the system owner gives the NVWA a mini-
mum of 40 addresses of customers that have been successfully audited. The 
NVWA then verifies whether it sees these firms as low-risk, based on the results 
of previous NVWA inspections. Subsequently, the NVWA will conduct a system 
audit at the system owner’s premises. Two NVWA staff members who have not 
previously been involved in the approval process assess the system and inspec-
tion reports. The next step is that the system owner solicits firms to participate in 
the system. If some 100 firms participate, the NVWA performs a ‘reality check’ 
to verify whether the system ensures a high level of compliance in practice. 
Should irregularities emerge, the NVWA can organise verification audits, in 
which case a private assessor will conduct an inspection, after which an NVWA 
inspector will directly visit the same premise to form his/her own impression of 
the situation. Once all these steps are completed, the NVWA accepts the pri-
vate system and announces it on its website. 
Several system owners were interested in having their system assessed and 
accepted by the NVWA. However, the NVWA did not offer a clear set of cri-
teria that system owners should meet to attain acceptance, nor was the proced-
ure for acceptance formalized. By its own admission, the NVWA did not want 
to use a straightjacket to apply to all systems. This approach, though, led to 
uncertainty among system owners who wanted to apply for NVWA accept-
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ance, and a certain level of resentment among those owners who saw their 
competitors gain acceptance. Our interviews suggest that the NVWA uses the 
following set of criteria before accepting BDW and other private systems, and 
verifying compliance with guides to good hygienic practices as ‘self-control 
systems’: 
 
1. Participating firms should be artisan, non-industrial (craftsman) food busi-
ness operators. 
2. System owners ensure food safety by verifying compliance with recognised 
guides to good hygienic practices. 
3. Inspections should cover all elements of the guide. 
4. Compliance levels of 80%. 
5. If non-compliance is observed, incidents must be re-inspected in a follow-up 
visit. 
6. A minimum of one inspection per annum. 
7. Inspections must be unannounced. 
8. Participating firms should formally approve the exchange of audit results 
between the system owner and the NVWA. 
 
Accreditation is not required, nor does the NVWA set specific requirements for 
the training and experience of inspectors (although this is part of the system 
audit conducted by the NVWA upon acceptance of the system). Moreover, al-
though the institutional separation of consultancy and inspection is not required, 
if it is absent then this does raise concerns at the NVWA. 
In common with the other six accepted self-control systems, BDW  reports 
monthly to the NVWA on the firms participating in the system. The NVWA as-
sumes that these firms are compliant with applicable regulations and does not 
inspect them.  
Finally, it is not clear how the NVWA will continue to assess and monitor the 
performance of private systems like that of BDW after acceptance. The NVWA 
anticipates that this ex post control will include annual meetings complemented 
by an office audit one year and random spot checks at participating firms in 
the alternate year. The NVWA organises a semi-annual plenary meeting to 
which all accepted self-control systems are invited to discuss new developments 
in the area and the general functioning of the systems and their collaboration 
with the NVWA in practice (e.g. in case of an outbreak of a food-borne de-
cease).  
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6. RiskPlaza 
System 
RiskPlaza is a private HACCP-based audit scheme to control food safety haz-
ards in raw materials and ingredients for food production. The scheme was 
launched in 2008 by the semi-public trade association Agricultural Product 
Board (Productschap Akkerbouw – Product Board). It initially applied only to 
the bakery sector, which had initiated the development of the scheme in 2005, 
but its application was soon extended to other sectors (vegetables, fruits, nuts, 
poultry, meat, oils and fats, convenience food). The RiskPlaza consists of two 
elements: a database that identifies potential food safety hazards and a ‘Risk-
Plaza Audit+’ system. The database concretises EU and national food safety 
regulations and is adopted and revised by the Product Board in collaboration 
with experts from various branches of industry and the certification bodies that 
are recognised as performing audits for the RiskPlaza Audit+ system. Partici-
pating firms in the food chain can consult the database to ensure that the pro-
ducts they source are safe. A covenant between the Product Board and NVWA 
defines the responsibilities of the Board vis-à-vis the NVWA and vice versa.9 It 
determines, amongst others, that the NVWA will use the information in the 
database for inspections, such that ‘a common truth’ exists about the potential 
hazards in raw materials and food ingredients.10 
The RiskPlaza Audit+ system supports suppliers in the food processing in-
dustry to comply with Article 5 Regulation 2004/852/EC, which requires that 
all food business operators have in place, implement and maintain permanent 
procedure(s) based on the HACCP principles to verify whether the raw materi-
als and ingredients they source are safe. The Product Board does not consider 
the audit system a certification scheme, despite the fact that certification bodies 
recognised by RiskPlaza perform the audits. No actual certificate is awarded 
after a successful audit: a firm merely receives the status of ‘RiskPlaza Audit+’ 
(Product Board 2013, p. 23). Suppliers of raw materials and food ingredients 
can apply for a RiskPlaza Audit+ provided they already have a certificate 
from an HACCP-based food safety scheme, such as the BRC Global Standard, 
Dutch HACCP or FSSC 22000, or from an NVWA-approved guide to good 
hygienic practice. Whereas such HACCP certification concerns the assessment of 
food production processes, the RiskPlaza Audit+ is an additional test – hence 
                                         
9  Convenant horizontaal toezicht tussen het Productschap Akkerbouw (systeemeigenaar 
RiskPlaza) en de Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit, Staatscourant 2012, 
13450. 
10  Ibid., at ‘Doelen en uitgangspunten’, no. 7. 
Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series: 2014/07 
 
 
15 
 
the ‘plus’ – specifically focused on controlling hazards in raw materials and 
food ingredients (Product Board 2013, p. 20). 
The compliance assessment during the RiskPlaza Audit+ is basically an ad-
ministrative audit of formalized risk management procedures, registration re-
quirements and the documentation of product analyses. Sample taking and an-
alysis are not included. These audits take place on the basis of announced vis-
its, although unannounced visits are possible (Product Board 2013, p. 24). If a 
producer sources its raw materials or ingredients from a supplier that has been 
awarded the status of RiskPlaza Audit+, the NVWA considers him/her to meet 
the obligations under Article 5 Regulation 2004/852/EC on sales verification. 
Separate verification of the product sourced from that supplier is no longer 
necessary for the producer. The NVWA inspections regarding sales verification 
will then cease in relation to this issue.11 Furthermore, the NVWA inspections at 
the RiskPlaza Audit+ supplier will cease.12 The NVWA remains competent, 
however, to perform inspections as regards other aspects of food safety regu-
lation.  
Some 50 firms have been audited following the RiskPlaza Audit+ 
scheme.13 The vast majority of these firms are located in the Netherlands, but a 
small number are based in Belgium and Germany. Four accredited third party 
certification bodies carry out the RiskPlaza audits,14 which are usually con-
ducted together with or after a regular HACCP food safety audit, such as those 
for standards like the BRC Global Standard and FSSC 22000. An audit is per-
formed annually and is thus broadly similar to the auditing frequency of regu-
lar HACCP-based private standards. The ‘system expert’ of RiskPlaza assesses 
the requirements that are set for the audits (Product Board 2013, p. 33). This 
expert is external consultant who evaluates the performance of the certification 
bodies as regards aspects of an audit’s comprehensiveness, consistency and 
quality, and reports to the Board annually. For that purpose, the expert collects 
all audit reports filed by the certification bodies and also participates in audits 
conducted by these bodies (witness audits) (Product Board p. 39-40). 
As of January 2014, product boards (productschappen) have been dis-
solved as part of a wider administrative reform in the Netherlands. To ensure 
the continuity of RiskPlaza its administration and operations have been trans-
ferred to the legal entities called RiskPlaza Foundation (RiskPlaza Stichting) 
                                         
11  Ibid., at ‘Verplichtingen NVWA’, no. 4. 
12  Ibid., at ‘Verplichtingen NVWA’, no. 5. 
13  Product Board, ‘RiskPlaza-audit+ bedrijven’ <https://www.riskplaza.nl/riskplaza/Rap-
portage/Bedrijven/BedrijvenOverzicht.aspx?1> accessed May 2014.  
14  Product Board, ‘Certificerende instellingen’, <https://www.riskplaza.nl/riskplaza/Rap-
portage/Certificerendeinstellingen/CertificerendeinstellingenOverzicht.aspx?1> access-
ed May 2014. 
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and RiskPlaza BV. It is expected that RiskPlaza will be sold to a commercial 
party in 2014. At the time of writing, it is not clear what consequences the dis-
solution of the Product Board and the potential sale of RiskPlaza will have for 
the functioning of RiskPlaza and its collaboration with the NVWA. 
Meta-control 
How does the NVWA assess and monitor the RiskPlaza scheme? Several instru-
ments and procedures apply. First, the NVWA has been closely involved in set-
ting the scheme up. When the first discussions between the Product Board and 
the bakery sector took place in 2005, the NVWA was asked to be involved. 
Now, the NVWA has a formal role in the governance of the regime as the ag-
ency participates in the so-called ‘expert hearings’ (deskundigenoverleg).15 In 
these hearings the content of the hazard database is adopted, determining the 
specific ingredient groups and factsheets of related hazards. The hearings also 
discuss recent developments and changes in food safety regulation (Product 
Board 2013, p. 37). Participation in the expert hearings, which take place at 
most four times a year, enables the NVWA to survey the substantive standards 
upon which RiskPlaza audits are based. Accordingly, it can see to it that the 
level of protection warranted by RiskPlaza is adequate, and that changes in 
legislation are correctly and swiftly implemented. 
Second, the NVWA also participates in the so-called ‘harmonisation hear-
ings’ (harmonisatie-overleg) that takes place annually between the auditors of 
the recognised certification bodies and the RiskPlaza system expert (Product 
Board 2013, p. 40). During these hearings the system expert presents the an-
alysis of the audit reports submitted by certification bodies and the witness 
audits. Cases are also discussed, although not so much at the level of individual 
certification bodies, but rather as examples to illustrate good (or bad) prac-
tices. Whereas participation in the expert hearings enables the NVWA to re-
main informed about the substantive standards upon which RiskPlaza audits are 
based, participation in the harmonisation hearings offers the NVWA up-to-
date information about the way audits are performed. In conclusion, it must thus 
be considered that the NVWA is closely involved in the governance and im-
plementation of the RiskPlaza scheme. 
The exchange of information between the Product Board and the NVWA 
also enables the latter to monitor and assess performance. The covenant re-
quires the Product Board to notify the NVWA in case of significant changes in 
the system, to grant the agency access to the database and to offer insights 
into the audit system’s functioning.16 From a public interest perspective it is 
                                         
15  Convenant RiskPlaza 2012, at ‘Verplichtingen NVWA’, no. 1. 
16  Ibid., at ‘Verplichtingen Productschap Akkerbouw’, no. 2, 5 and 7. 
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worth observing that there is no obligation on the side of the Product Board to 
advise and alert the NVWA in cases of major non-compliance and serious risks 
to public health and safety.17 The audit reports are not automatically shared 
with the NVWA and the agency did not require the Product Board to oblige 
the recognised certification bodies to share them either. Nonetheless, there are 
several ways in which the NVWA can access information about regulatory 
compliance by firms possessing the RiskPlaza Audit+ status. First of all, the 
NVWA can monitor the RiskPlaza website for changes in the status of firms. 
Second, it may request the audit report from the firm upon inspection. Third, the 
NVWA receives general information on the performance of audited firms and 
certification bodies when participating in the harmonisation hearings. Finally, 
the NVWA may organise a system audit to evaluate the entire scheme.18 As 
the covenant notes, audit reports and random spot checks at participating firms 
may be part of this audit. The NVWA performed its first system audit on the 
RiskPlaza scheme late in 2013, that is, after we had conducted our interviews. 
The audit report has not been made public and thus little is known about the 
methodology applied and the results, except that RiskPlaza is a ‘properly op-
erating system with sufficient safeguards’.19 
7. Comparison and discussion 
Hybridisation  
The analysis shows that the systems of food safety control operated by BDW 
and RiskPlaza are now closely tied to the NVWA. This hybridisation is mani-
fested across different dimensions and regulatory activities (see Havinga and 
Verbruggen 2014). The following two tables highlight the characteristics of the 
hybridisation occurring in the case of the accepted self-control systems of BDW 
and RiskPlaza.  
 
                                         
17  The covenant concerns only the situation that the NVWA provides information to the 
Product Board about food safety incidents at participating firms. See Convenant RiskPla-
za 2012, at ‘Verplichtingen Productschap Akkerbouw’, no. 8. 
18  Ibid., at ‘Verplichtingen NVWA’, no. 2-3. 
19  Personal communcation NVWA. 
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Table 1: Hybridisation in the case of BDW 
Regulatory  
activities 
Dimension of  
hybridisation 
a. Agenda-
setting & rule-
making 
b. Adoption & 
implementation 
c. Monitoring 
& enforce-
ment 
d. Evaluation 
& review 
1. Actors involved 
 
Food industry 
(guides to 
good hygienic 
practices), 
NVWA. 
Individual 
firms. 
BDW inspec-
tors. 
BDW, 
NVWA, six 
other ac-
cepted sys-
tems. 
2 Motivations and drivers 
 
Firm reputa-
tion, efficiency 
in supply chain, 
Government 
cuts, EU Regu-
lation 
882/2004/EC. 
Better rule 
compliance, 
competitive 
advantages. 
Verification, 
learning, risk 
assessment. 
System veri-
fication, 
learning and 
review. 
3. Mechanisms and instru-
ments 
 
Informal meet-
ings, bargain-
ing, NVWA 
acceptance. 
Inspection 
protocol, audit 
contracts, fran-
chise contracts. 
BDW inspec-
tions. 
NVWA ‘sys-
tem audits’. 
4. Character of interaction 
 
Deliberative 
discussions. 
Cooptation. Coordination. Coordination. 
5. Results and effects 
 
NVWA ac-
ceptance of 
the scheme. 
No NVWA 
visits for BDW 
customers who 
have been 
successfully 
audited. 
High costs 
for partici-
pating firms, 
closer fo-
cused 
NVWA in-
spections. 
unknown. 
6. Change over time 
 
NVWA ex-
tends policy of 
acceptance to 
other private 
assurance 
schemes 
n/a n/a n/a 
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Table 2: Hybridisation in the case of RiskPlaza 
Regulatory  
activities 
Dimension  
of hybridisation 
a. Agenda-
setting & rule-
making 
b. Adoption & 
implementation 
c. Monitoring 
& enforcement 
d. Evaluation 
& review 
1. Actors involved 
 
Food industry 
(Product Board), 
independent 
experts, includ-
ing 
NVWA. 
Product Board, 
individual 
firms, NVWA, 
certification 
bodies. 
Certification 
bodies, 
NVWA. 
‘system ex-
pert’, 
NVWA, ac-
creditation 
body. 
2 Motivations and dri-
vers 
 
Industry reputa-
tion, efficiency in 
supply chain, 
Government cuts, 
EU Regulation. 
882/2004/EC. 
Improved rule 
compliance, 
competitive 
advantages. 
Verification, 
learning, risk 
assessment. 
System veri-
fication, 
learning and 
review. 
3. Mechanisms and 
instruments 
 
Informal meet-
ings, bargaining, 
NVWA accept-
ance. 
Audit protocol, 
inter-firm con-
tracts, public 
covenant. 
Audits, inspec-
tions, NVWA 
sample-taking, 
reality checks. 
Witness 
audits, 
NVWA ‘sys-
tem audits’. 
4. Character of interac-
tion 
 
Deliberative 
discussions in 
expert meetings. 
Cooptation. Coordination 
via harmonisa-
tion meetings. 
Coordination, 
‘Running 
Code’. 
5. Results and effects 
 
NVWA accept-
ance of the 
scheme, Small 
industry uptake. 
‘Common truth’ 
in database, 
limitation of 
NVWA inspec-
tions. 
High costs for 
participating 
firms, closer 
focused 
NVWA inspec-
tions. 
Improvement 
auditing 
protocol. 
6. Change over time 
 
NVWA extends 
policy of ac-
ceptance to 
other private 
assurance 
schemes. 
RiskPlaza is 
sold to com-
mercial third 
party, leading 
to changes in 
governance. 
Introduction of 
possibility of 
conducting 
unannounced 
audits. 
n/a 
 
Two issues require further comment. First, the hybridisation of public and pri-
vate food governance occurs across different regulatory activities. This diversi-
fication of hybridisation is most notable in the case of RiskPlaza. Here, the 
NVWA not only participates in the agenda-setting and rule-making stage, but 
also in the other stages of the regulatory process. Hybridisation is prevalent 
here and as a result, this system can be seen as truly co-regulatory in nature 
(Garcia Martinez, Verbruggen, Fearne 2013). In the case of BDW, BDW in-
spectors monitor and enforce guides to good hygienic practices, which have 
been adopted by industry representatives and approved by the NVWA. Here, 
hybridity emerges first and foremost from the requirements that the NVWA 
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sets for acceptance and the consequences such acceptance has for the monitor-
ing and enforcement activities of the NVWA itself.  
Second, the public-private hybridisation displayed in this paper occurs at 
the national level with very little references to transnational private govern-
ance arrangements, which play a highly significant role in the food industry. As 
noted, certification for transnational standards, such as those recognized within 
the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), have not been accepted by the 
NVWA. Limiting its meta-control strategy to national schemes appears a wise 
thing to do. It enables the NVWA to carefully construct its strategy and start 
with a controllable number of systems and participating firms that enjoy a ben-
efit in terms of inspection frequency. It also seems to us that the NVWA, as the 
national food safety agency, is likely to have more influence on small, nation-
ally oriented systems than on sizeable systems benchmarked by GFSI. Never-
theless, the agency is investigating the option of extending its meta-control 
strategy to transnational certification schemes such as the Global Standard of 
the British Retail Consortium and the Food Standard of International Featured 
Standards (representing French, German and Italian retailers). This raises the 
question of how the NVWA will accept these schemes (do the same criteria ap-
ply as for BDW?) and how will it continue to monitor scheme performance after 
acceptance. Arguably, requiring these schemes to meet NVWA standards and 
surveying performance after acceptance will be much more difficult in practice, 
given that these schemes are owned and administered by foreign parties. 
Meta-control 
There are several similarities between the ways in which the NVWA organises 
its meta-controls as regards the two accepted self-control systems. In both 
cases, BDW and RiskPlaza, a clear set of conditions for acceptance was absent 
from the start; these conditions have been set along the way as experience 
with the policy grew. In the case of private control systems such as BDW a 
number of clear-cut criteria that apply to similar private control systems are 
now used. RiskPlaza, however, remains a unique system, in which the NVWA 
has been closely involved from its inception.  
A remarkable difference is that the NVWA has not required RiskPlaza to 
employ unannounced audits, whereas this is an undisputed condition for the ac-
ceptance of private control systems such as BDW. In both cases, however, the 
NVWA conducted an audit on the systems before accepting them. They also 
performed random checks at participating firms to assess the reliability of the 
systems, that is, to verify whether the private inspection results did not differ 
significantly from the findings of the NVWA when visiting the premises. It is too 
soon to draw any conclusions about the effectiveness of the NVWA meta-
controls after the systems of BDW and RiskPlaza were accepted. The intention 
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is to monitor system performance by organising intermittent meetings, system 
audits and random verification checks. As noted, the NVWA performed its first 
system audit on the RiskPlaza scheme late in 2013. The methodology applied 
and the results remain undisclosed, however. 
There are also some significant differences. To take one example, the 
NVWA has the possibility to request at any moment an audit report of a firm 
audited by BDW. The NVWA has that option since it obliges BDW to require 
from its customers the possibility to forward audit results to the NVWA. In the 
case of RiskPlaza, audit reports can only be shared with the NVWA in the con-
text of a system audit. The certification bodies recognised by RiskPlaza do not 
demand from their customers the ability to share any audit results with the 
NVWA, nor does RiskPlaza require these certification bodies to do so upon 
recognition. Instead, the service contracts between the certification bodies and 
their customers typically include confidentiality clauses that bar them from shar-
ing any information on audit result with third parties. The NVWA will be able 
to access the audit results when inspecting the firm; it will then ask for the rel-
evant audit reports. RiskPlaza is obliged to maintain a public record (website) 
of the RiskPlaza Audit+ firms. That obligation is absent in the case of BDW. The 
difference is smaller than it seems, however. BDW maintains on its website a list 
of customers with a BDW certificate, provided the customer agrees to that noti-
fication. 
Pros and cons 
Generally speaking, a key benefit for public authorities such as NVWA of col-
laborating with private control systems such as BDW and RiskPlaza appears to 
lie in the efficiencies that can be achieved in monitoring and enforcement. In 
times of budgetary constraints, engaging with pre-existing private assurance 
schemes can indeed be a cost-effective alternative to reduce inspection costs, 
while maintaining inspection coverage. Furthermore, the private schemes that 
have been recognized may contribute to better compliance of firms as they 
tend to visit firms more often, and they may combine inspection and advice in 
their services (Wright et al. 2013). Firms that participate in publicly recognized 
schemes benefit from fewer official inspections and may therefore experience 
less red tape and lower administrative burdens. This benefit may constitute an 
important driver for compliance with the scheme’s requirements. Owners of the 
recognised schemes, for their part, are likely to attract more customers, as a 
successful audit process will offer such customers a favourable inspection re-
gime.  
There are nonetheless considerable risks involved in the meta-control strat-
egy as currently employed by the NVWA. For one, a recognized scheme such 
as RiskPlaza does not provide an absolute warranty of rule compliance. Cer-
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tificate holders have been found to violate food safety laws (Beuger 2012, 
21). Private auditors are paid for by the auditees which constitutes a structural 
conflict of interest between the financial interests of the auditor and protecting 
the public from food safety risks (Lytton and McAllister 2014). Also the fact 
that the functions of third party audits do not overlap with those of official in-
spections and that certain methodologies (sample testing) are not used limits the 
purpose for which the private schemes can be used by public authorities. Public 
authorities are thus challenged to create an operational framework by which 
relevant changes in the status of certified firms are instantly communicated to it. 
In this sense it is disturbing to see that the information sharing arrangements 
designed by the NVWA and the accepted private control systems do not re-
quire auditors to advise and alert public authorities in case of major incidents 
of non-compliance and serious risks to public health and safety. The arrange-
ment currently used relies on the authority to actively check certification data, 
which generates the risk that non-compliant firms can slip through the meta-
control system. 
Another concern is that the inspection frequency of the public authorities 
may be too low to incentivize firms to participate in the recognized private 
schemes. Firms that participate in these schemes make considerable investments 
to comply with the scheme’s requirements and they pay for the auditing 
services. The premise that these firms will benefit from a more favourable in-
spection regime than the firms that do not participate can only be true if the 
public authority has the capacity to inspect the non-participating firms. It ap-
pears that, at least in the Netherlands, the NVWA does not have that capacity 
(Havinga and Van Waarden 2013, 80, Verbruggen and Havinga 2014a, 28). 
This leads to a free rider problem: non-participating firms enjoy lower costs and 
may be subject to the same inspection rate as applicant firms. This potentially 
undermines the effectiveness of the entire collaboration. 
There are also concerns as regards the process of accepting private 
schemes. In both cases of BDW and RiskPlaza, recognition revolved around 
general criteria of independence, transparency, inclusiveness and legal compli-
ance. However, formalised procedures that guide the process of acceptation 
have not been established. As a consequence, the procedure for applying for 
recognition, the criteria that must be met, and the period for which recognition 
is granted remain unclear. Furthermore, there is no formal procedure to monitor 
the performance of recognized schemes, nor to assess whether they are eligible 
for an extension of (the term of) recognition. While it can be argued that an 
increased level of formalisation and proceduralisation of scheme recognition 
may hamper the development of co-regulatory arrangements, the absence of 
official guidance on how and when to gain recognition challenges principles 
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like transparency, consistency and fairness in decision-making, which clearly 
apply to government bodies such as the NVWA. 
8. Conclusion 
The analysis of the meta-control strategy of the NVWA teaches us that the ag-
ency has carefully tried to design its strategy and establish the conditions for 
collaboration with the private food safety control systems of BDW and Risk-
Plaza. Its approach is characterised by pragmatism and it has managed to lay 
down some fundamental safeguards for meta-controls to be successful. The dif-
ference between the meta-control exercised in the case of BDW and RiskPlaza 
is primarily related to the consequences of NVWA’s acceptance of these sys-
tems for the NVWA’s monitoring and enforcement activities. In case of the 
BDW a more comprehensive (and stricter) set of conditions apply than in the 
case of RiskPlaza, since a positive BDW inspection leads to the termination of 
NVWA inspections. In the case of RiskPlaza a successful audit only leads to a 
partial replacement of NVWA inspections. Another significant point is that the 
NVWA was closely involved in establishing the RiskPlaza system and continues 
to have a formal position in the adoption of the norms on which controls are 
based. As regards the other circumstance that we supposed to exert an influ-
ence on the design of the meta-control strategy, namely the commercial nature 
of the system owners, we found no evidence. This may be explained by the 
fact that RiskPlaza, while being administered by a not-for-profit organisation, 
uses commercial third-party certification bodies to perform audits. 
The analysis also reveals a number of weak spots in the NVWA’s meta-
control strategy. A significant shortcoming in the current design of the strategy 
is that the agency does not have the capacity to submit non-participating firms 
to a closer inspection regime than firms that participate in accepted self-control 
systems. Accordingly, non-participant firms enjoy lower costs than participating 
firms. The free rider problem that thus emerges makes the accepted self-control 
systems rather unattractive. Furthermore, the information exchange between the 
NVWA and accepted systems relies on the agency actively to check compli-
ance data. The systems, their auditors and inspectors are not required to advise 
and alert the agency in case of major non-compliance and serious risks to pub-
lic health and safety. This generates the risk that instances of non-compliance 
will go unnoticed and slip through the meta-control system. Moreover, it is 
recommended that the NVWA should formalise their procedure of accepting 
private food safety control systems to enhance uniformity and transparency 
around formal acceptance. 
At this moment, the real functioning of the NVWA’s meta-control strategy is 
still to be determined. The oversight the strategy implies has so far been pri-
marily limited to ex ante checks and audits upon acceptance of the private sys-
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tems. It is not clear how the NVWA will continue to assess performance after 
acceptance and which terms and conditions will apply for re-acceptance (or the 
revocation of acceptance for that matter). As noted, the agency is currently 
considering the option of extending its meta-control strategy to transnational 
certification schemes benchmarked by the GFSI. The possible acceptance of 
such schemes in the near future will raise the same questions that have been 
addressed here: what criteria apply for acceptance and how will scheme per-
formance after acceptance be monitored? In considering the GFSI bench-
marked schemes the NVWA can build on its experience with national private 
food control systems, eventually to develop a clear and consistent methodology 
of meta-controls. After our research the NVWA announced criteria for the ac-
ceptance of private schemes.20 The NVWA is now in the process of assessing 
schemes that applied for acceptance. 
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